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Transferring Away Human Rights: Using 





An estimated sixty percent of international trade happens within multinational enterprises. 
Transfer pricing occurs when one part of a firm sets a price in order to sell to another division in 
another country. When these prices are deliberately set at something other than market rate in 
order to minimize the firm’s tax liability, this is known as transfer mispricing, or abusive transfer 
pricing. These practices account for an enormous portion of global illicit financial flows. This 
paper will consider transfer mispricing as a violation of human rights, and will look at the ways 
in which various human rights instruments and mechanisms might be employed in order to 
address this global problem. In doing so, this paper seeks to add to a growing body of literature 
that considers the human rights implications and the importance of incorporating a human 
rights approach to issues like tax policy, trade, and corruption, with the aim of addressing the 
underlying structural drivers of human rights violations. It also seeks to address a gap in law 
and policy discussions that is generally characterized by an uneven power relationship between 




In recent years a great deal of global attention has been focused on international taxation 
issues, and particularly transfer pricing: the prices that one division or subsidiary of a 
transnational corporation (“TNC”)1 sets in order to sell to another division or subsidiary in 
another country. It is unsurprising that this should have become an area of focus, given that 
estimates hold that up to sixty percent of global trade may now happen within TNCs.2 The 
reason that transfer pricing is a significant area of concern is its great potential for transfer 
mispricing, also known as abusive transfer pricing, which occurs when firms set prices for these 
international intrafirm sales at rates other than the market rate, generally in order to take 
advantage of tax differences between jurisdictions. For example, in 2008, revenue authorities in 
Zambia investigated a global mining company, Glencore, and found that copper from a mine 
primarily owned by a Glencore subsidiary in Zambia was being sold to the Swiss-based parent 
                                                 
1
 There has been much discussion of the exact definition of a transnational corporation. This paper will use the terms 
“TNC,” “multinational,” “company,” and “firm” interchangeably to discuss “companies or other entities established 
in more than one country and so linked that they may coordinate their operations in various ways.” Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, at 17, (2011), 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en.  
2
 Transfer Pricing, Tax Justice Network, http://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-tax/transfer-pricing/ (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2015).  
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company at prices significantly below the market rate.3 These practices, which are sometimes 
illegal and sometimes technically legal but still abusive,4 make up a significant proportion of 
global illicit financial flows (“IFF”),5 defined as money that is illegally or illicitly obtained, 
transferred, or utilized.6 They deprive states of billions of dollars’ worth of potential tax 
revenues.7 
These abusive corporate practices have been the subject of intense technical discussion by 
economists and diplomats, particularly at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (“OECD”).8 At the same time, a handful of international non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”), notably ActionAid, Christian Aid, and the Tax Justice Network, have 
sought to illuminate the human costs of these practices as a result of the revenue lost by 
developing countries.9 This paper seeks to build on the work of those organizations, and also on 
the work of actors including the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute 
(“IBAHRI”) and a number of United Nations Special Rapporteurs who seek to elucidate the 
linkages between taxation and human rights, specifically by examining transfer mispricing as a 
human rights violation.10 
As early as 1992, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Economic and Social Rights recognized 
that “the system of levying tax should be a criteria against which compliance with international 
obligations is measured, as well as a central means of redressing existing imbalances of income 
distribution.”11 Although there is much room for debate regarding the ideal taxation system,12 
                                                 
3
 AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL, EQUITY IN EXTRACTIVES: STEWARDING AFRICA’S NATURAL RESOURCES FOR ALL: 
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 65 (2013). The Africa Progress Panel is a group of ten high-level individuals from the 
public and private sector, chaired by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, that advocates for equitable and 
sustainable development in Africa. The Panel issues an annual report that seeks to highlight important issues for 
development policy. 
4
 See infra section II (a) for a discussion of the terms tax evasion, tax avoidance, and tax abuse.  
5
 DEV KAR & JOSEPH SPANJERS, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: 2003-12 vii (2014) (“The vast majority of illicit financial flows – 77.8 percent in the 10-year period 
covered in this report – are due to trade misinvoicing.”). 
6
 See GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM AFRICA: HIDDEN RESOURCE FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 7 (2010). 
7
 See KAR & SPANJERS, supra note 6, at vii. 
8
 See, e.g., OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration [CTPA], News Conference – Launch of the 2015 BEPS 
Package, (Oct. 5, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dVRVfIz9c64.  
9
 See, e.g., ACTIONAID, HOW TAX HAVENS PLUNDER THE POOR (May 2013), available at 
https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/how_tax_havens_plunder_the_poor_2.pdf. See also 
TAX JUSTICE NETWORK-AFRICA & CHRISTIAN AID, AFRICA RISING? INEQUALITIES AND THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF 
FAIR TAXATION (Feb. 2014). 
10
 See LLOYD LIPSETT ET AL., INT’L BAR ASSOC. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., TAX ABUSES, POVERTY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION’S HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE TASK FORCE ON ILLICIT 
FINANCIAL FLOWS, POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 28 (Oct. 2013). See also Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky (Independent 
Expert), U.N. Human Rights Council, Illicit Financial Flows, Human Rights and the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/60 (Feb. 10 2015). See also U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena Sepùlveda Carmona, ¶ 77, A/HRC/26/28 (May 22, 
2014) [hereinafter Carmona]. See also Philip Alston, Keynote Address at Christian Aid Conference on The Human 
Rights Impact of Tax and Fiscal Policy: Tax Policy is Human Rights Policy: The Irish Debate (Feb. 12, 2015) 
(transcript available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/EPoverty/Alston-Tax_policy.docx). 
11
 Danilo Türk (Special Rapporteur, Comm. on Human Rights), The Realization of Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights, ¶ 83, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2 (July 3, 1992). 
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and the optimal tax policy will necessarily vary according to local and national circumstances,13 
it is widely recognized that domestic resource mobilization through progressive taxation can be 
an important tool in achieving equity and social progress.14 And yet human rights commentaries 
often leave out taxation as a means of resource generation,15 and the human rights discourse is 
only beginning to pay serious attention to the human rights effects of taxation policies.16  
Transfer mispricing, as a specific and widespread form of tax abuse, both has its own set of 
human rights implications and is illustrative of many of the human rights violations caused by 
international tax abuse more generally. Tax abusive practices deprive states of resources 
necessary to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill human rights.17 They slow the progress of the 
right to development, subvert the right to self-determination, exacerbate social and economic 
inequality, and damage governmental accountability. Transfer mispricing, in particular, 
represents a failure of transparency, as well as a failure of states to fulfill their extra-territorial 
human rights obligations and their human rights obligations as actors in the international 
economic and social order. 
By examining the human rights implications of transfer mispricing, this paper seeks to open 
up new strategies for addressing this global problem and new ways of considering it. Part I of the 
paper provides an overview of the mechanics of transfer mispricing and its effects, particularly in 
the developing world. Part II discusses the ways in which transfer mispricing directly violates or 
leads to the violation of a number of human rights and human rights principles. Finally, Part III 
seeks to enhance the practical utility of this discussion by explaining some of the technical 
solutions that are proposed for this global problem and suggesting some of the ways that a 
human rights framework can be used to combat abusive transfer mispricing. 
 
 
I. TRANSFER MISPRICING AND ITS EFFECTS 
 
A. How does transfer mispricing work? 
 
According to the principle of tax sovereignty, each state is entitled to set its own tax policy 
without interference from others, resulting in potentially vast differences between the tax policy 
and tax rates applied to components of TNCs located in different jurisdictions.18 Setting a lower 
tax rate may allow a country “to enhance its competitive advantage in the marketplace for 
                                                                                                                                                             
12
 See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, et al., Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mankiw/files/optimal_taxation_in_theory.pdf. 
13
 IMF, IMF Policy Paper: Fiscal Policy and Income Equality, ¶ 30-39 (Jan. 23, 2014). 
14
 See CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS & CHRISTIAN AID, A POST-2015 FISCAL REVOLUTION: HUMAN 
RIGHTS POLICY BRIEF, at 5 (May 2014), http://www.cesr.org/downloads/fiscal.revolution.pdf. See also IMF, IMF 
Policy Paper: Fiscal Policy and Income Equality, ¶ 34-35 (Jan. 23, 2014). 
15
 Ignacio Saiz, Resourcing Rights: Combating Tax Injustice from a Human Rights Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND PUBLIC FINANCE: BUDGETS AND THE PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 81 (Aoife Nolan et al. 
eds., 2013).  
16
 See LIPSETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 8-9 (“In general, stakeholders noted that tax abuses have not often been 
approached from a human rights perspective; however, there are indications that this conversation about human 
rights and tax is beginning.”). 
17
 Tax Justice Network Germany, “Taxes and Human Rights,” Policy Brief (Feb. 2013). 
18 See, e.g., Diane M. Ring, Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax Sovereignty in Shaping 
Tax Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 555 (2009). 
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capital, investment, and/or nominal business presence.”19 However, these differing rates also 
open up the possibility of cross-border tax manipulation.20 In order to avoid such manipulation 
by TNCs, most countries have transfer pricing rules, the purpose of which “is to establish how 
transactions within a multinational (the price that a subsidiary, for example, charges to the parent 
company for specific components of a product) should be accounted for tax purposes.”21  
The fact is that the various elements of a TNC “are not subject to the same market forces 
shaping relations between two independent companies,” but, legally, these entities often get 
treated like they are completely separate and independent, despite their behavior to the 
contrary.22 Thus transfer pricing rules are generally quite easy to evade and to manipulate to the 
tax benefit of the multinational and to the detriment of tax revenues.23 While a distinction is 
often drawn between illegal tax evasion and legal tax avoidance that takes advantages of 
loopholes or of differences between the tax laws in different jurisdictions, this paper will follow 
the practice of others in referring to “tax abuse” or “abusive practices” to capture actions that fall 
on both sides of the line of technical legality.24 This is because while tax evasion and tax 
avoidance may vary in their methods and legality, many of their consequences, particularly their 
human rights effects, are similar and can be addressed with similar strategies.25 Further, transfer 
mispricing, the particular form of tax abuse addressed by this paper, can be accomplished both 
through legal and illegal means. 
Transfer mispricing can take at least four different forms: export mispricing, import 
mispricing, IP rights, and re-invoicing. They are all designed to have a number of effects related 
to a company’s tax situation. The first, export mispricing, is where a “subsidiary of a company 
avoids paying taxes in a relatively high-tax country by selling its products at a loss to a 
subsidiary in a low-tax country, which then sells the product to final customers at market price 
and yields the profit.”26 This form of transfer mispricing is illustrated by the actions of Glencore 
in Zambia, described above. The second, import mispricing, occurs “where locally run 
enterprises are able to shift profits to affiliates in countries offering lower levels of taxation 
through…artificially inflating the price paid for intermediate products purchased from overseas 
affiliates so as to lower stated local profits.”27 For example, ActionAid has chronicled how 
global beer company SABMiller’s breweries in Ghana pay extremely high fees for “management 
services” from a Swiss-based affiliate, thus lowering corporate profits within Ghana.28 Thirdly, 
and increasingly commonly, companies will “store” their intellectual property rights in a 
subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction and then charge affiliates in high-tax jurisdictions artificially 
                                                 
19 Ring, supra note 18, at 562. 
20 See, e.g., id. at 564. 
21
 CLAUDIO RADAELLI, CREATING THE INTERNATIONAL TAX ORDER: TRANSFER PRICING AND THE SEARCH FOR 
COORDINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY 3 (European University Institute Working Papers RSC 98/28 1998). 
22
LIPSETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 28. 
23
 See, e.g., HIGH LEVEL PANEL ON ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM AFRICA, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS 27-28 
(2015) [hereinafter HLPIFFA]. 
24
 See, e.g., LIPSETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 7. See also Carmona, supra note 10, at ¶ 3. See also EURODAD ET. AL., 
HIDDEN PROFITS: THE EU’S ROLE IN SUPPORTING AN UNJUST GLOBAL TAX SYSTEM 18 (2014), 
http://www.eurodad.org/files/pdf/1546298-hidden-profits-the-eu-s-role-in-supporting-an-unjust-global-tax-system-
2014-.pdf (using “tax dodging” to the same effect). 
25
 LIPSETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 7. 
26
 Bohoslavsky, supra note 10, at ¶ 5. 
27
 Saiz, supra note 16, at 86. 
28
 ACTIONAID, CALLING TIME: WHY SABMILLER SHOULD STOP DODGING TAXES IN AFRICA 8 (2012). 
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high rates for the use of that intellectual property.29 SABMiller, for example, holds the rights to 
brands of beer sold in Africa in a Dutch company, to which African brewers must pay significant 
royalties.30 Fourthly, and clearly illegal, re-invoicing,31 “occurs when goods leave a country of 
export under one invoice, then the invoice is redirected to another jurisdiction…where the price 
is altered, and then the revised invoice is sent to the importing country for clearing and payment 
purposes.”32 Because of the illegal nature of these practices it is more difficult to point to specific 
examples, but researchers have calculated that they lead to significant annual tax revenue losses, 
particularly in developing countries.33 
The existence of jurisdictions with particularly favorable terms of corporate taxation, 
generally called tax havens, is crucial to corporations’ abilities to successfully engage in these 
sorts of abusive practices. ActionAid estimates that “almost one in every two dollars of reported 
corporate investment in developing countries is now being routed from or via a tax haven.”34 
Further, “poor countries may be more vulnerable to this practice than wealthier ones: 46% of 
reported cross-border investment into low- and lower-middle income countries in 2011 came 
from tax havens, compared to 37% into upper-middle and high-income countries.”35 In addition 
to having extremely low tax rates, many of these tax havens are also “secrecy jurisdictions,” 
helping corporations to hide their incomes and investments. These secrecy jurisdictions, as well 
as “the more widely condoned practices of corporate tax opacity” around the world are also key 
to permitting the persistence of transfer mispricing.36 This opacity is characterized by a lack of 
information on “beneficial ownership,” which is to say the details of corporate structure and who 
really owns various international subsidiaries, and “the fact that companies are not required to 
report systematically their income and activities on a country-by-country basis.”37  
In addition to the increased likelihood of having investment or profits funneled through tax 
havens, developing nations are also hampered by a typical lack of capacity of their tax authorities 
to establish and enforce transfer pricing rules.38 In 2014, the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial 
Flows from Africa found that “only three African countries had transfer pricing units in their 
internal revenue services.”39 Developing country tax authorities may lack the information 
required to make effective use of a system of tax information exchange.40 While such systems 
are commonly cited as a potential solution to the problem of the lack of global tax transparency, 
they can be complex and expensive, and technical reciprocity requirements often mean that 
                                                 
29
 MARKUS HENN, FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, TAX HAVENS AND THE TAXATION OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS 5 (June 2013). 
30
 ACTIONAID, supra note 29, at 8. 
31
 See ANN HOLLINGSHEAD, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, THE IMPLIED TAX REVENUE LOSS FROM TRADE 
MISPRICING (2010). 
32
 Id. at 1. 
33
 HOLLINGSHEAD, supra note 32, at 19. 
34




 TAX JUSTICE NETWORK-AFRICA & CHRISTIAN AID, supra note 10, at 29. 
37
 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, 
Magdalena Sepùlveda Carmona, ¶ 77, A/HRC/26/28 (May 22, 2014) [hereinafter Sepùlveda Carmona]. 
38
 LIPSETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 30. 
39
 HLPIFFA, supra note 24, at 27. 
40
 Id. at 46. See also AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL, supra note 4, at 65. 
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developing countries are blocked from participating.41 Accordingly, a power imbalance can be 
created between countries with substantial capacity and information and those without, making 
those without more vulnerable to transfer pricing activities.42 
 
B. What is the global impact of transfer mispricing? 
 
Transfer mispricing does significant damage to tax collection around the world and also has 
wide-ranging economic and social effects beyond the lost revenue. A number of efforts have 
been made to calculate the monetary loss that is incurred around the world and in particular 
countries as a result of transfer mispricing. However, “since illicit financial flows are by 
definition hidden, it is inevitable that estimates will be subject to substantial uncertainty.”43 
Further, the complicated nature of the international financial system generally and transfer 
pricing in particular can lead to variations in estimates, as choices are made about which 
practices to include and how impacts are calculated.44  
Still, while there may not be an exact figure available for the amount of money lost to 
transfer mispricing, one widely-cited estimate suggests that transfer mispricing may cost 
developing countries alone up to $160 billion each year,45 and a brief survey of the various 
monetary estimates can help to give a sense of the magnitude of this problem. Since, as described 
above, the burden of transfer mispricing falls more heavily on developing countries, much of the 
study of the effects of transfer mispricing also focuses on these countries. In addition to the 
capacity and vulnerability issues described above, transfer mispricing is also in some ways a 
greater burden on developing countries because they are more reliant on corporate taxes, 
particularly from TNCs: in developed countries, on average, corporate taxes constitute about ten 
percent of total tax revenues,46 whereas in developing nations corporate taxes tend to make up 
more than 25% of the tax base.47  
The serious study of the question of the amounts lost to transfer mispricing was initiated in 
2005 by Raymond Baker with the publication of his book, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty 
Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System.48 One of Baker’s key insights was that 
although issues like corruption and illegal trafficking tend to attract a good deal of attention, the 
actual amount of money lost to these activities is dwarfed by the amounts lost to transfer 
mispricing and other corporate tax evasion.49  Subsequent to that publication, Baker founded an 
NGO, Global Financial Integrity (“GFI”), which studies IFFs and related policies. GFI has been 
                                                 
41
 HLPIFFA, supra note 24, at 46, 59, 71-72. 
42
 DAVID MCNAIR ET AL., CHRISTIAN AID, TRANSFER PRICING, AND THE TAXING RIGHTS OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 2 (2010). 
43
 Bohoslavsky, supra note 10, at ¶ 8. 
44
 See KAR & SPANJERS, supra note 6, at 3-6 (discussing GFI’s methodology for calculating illicit financial flows 
and comparing to methods used by others). 
45
 CHRISTIAN AID, DEATH AND TAXES: THE TRUE TOLL OF TAX DODGING 5 (2008). 
46
 R.S. Avi-Yonah, Hanging Together: A Multilateral Approach to Taxing Multinationals, 3 available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2344760 (last visited Oct. 17, 2016). 
47
 Id. p. 4. 
48
 RAYMOND BAKER, CAPITALISM’S ACHILLES HEEL: DIRTY MONEY AND HOW TO RENEW THE FREE-MARKET 
SYSTEM (2005). 
49
 See KAR & SPANJERS, supra note 6, at vii. 
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publishing annual reports on IFFs out of developing countries over a ten-year period.50 Their 
most recent study, cited above, “finds that between 2003 and 2012, the developing world lost US 
$6.6 trillion in illicit outflows,” including US $991.2 billion in 2012 alone.51 Almost eighty 
percent of these flows can be attributed to trade misinvoicing,52 which encompasses both the 
kind of reinvoicing within multinationals described above and manipulated invoices when a 
company sells to an unrelated entity. It is worth noting that the size of these flows has grown 
almost every year that GFI has studied them, at an average of 9.4 percent each year.53  
Even given global reductions in corporate tax rates and increased use of tax incentives to 
attract foreign investment, the tax revenue lost from these outflows is substantial. Ann 
Hollingshead, also working with GFI, estimates “that developing countries lost somewhere 
between US $98 billion and US $107 billion per year in tax revenues between 2002 and 2006” 
due to only a subset of transfer mispricing—re-invoicing.54 Another frequently cited estimate, 
referenced above, comes from Christian Aid, which attempted to include all of the types of 
transfer mispricing described in section I(a) above,55 and which calculated that transfer 
mispricing and false invoicing cost the developing world $160 billion annually in tax revenues.56  
Research has also focused on specific countries, geographic regions, or sectors. For example, 
in Zambia, 2008 estimates suggest that nearly half of the national GDP was lost to transfer 
mispricing of copper exports.57 In a study of five African countries from 2002-2011, GFI found 
that “Ghana lost $386 million, Kenya lost $435 million, Mozambique lost $187 million, 
Tanzania lost $248 million, and Uganda lost $243 million on average per year in potential tax 
and tariff revenue during the ten-year period of the study.”58 Even in highly developed Norway, 
a government study found that up to 30% of potential taxes due from foreign multinationals were 
being lost to transfer mispricing.59 Former U.N. Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and 
human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, noted that “the annual loss to Africa from transfer 
mispricing has been estimated at $38 billion, higher than the flow of development assistance to 
the region over the same period.”60  
This last point is particularly important, that the magnitude and significance of the problem 
of transfer mispricing are made more clear by considering the problem in the context of the 
financial flows that are more frequently associated with developing nations: official development 
aid (“ODA”) and debt. As GFI points out, “while African countries have had to shoulder a heavy 
                                                 
50






 Id. at 7. 
54
 HOLLINGSHEAD, supra note 32, at 14. 
55 See CHRISTIAN AID, DEATH AND TAXES: THE TRUE TOLL OF TAX DODGING 53 (2008), available at 
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/deathandtaxes.pdf. 
56
 Id. at 5. 
57
 Nicholas J. Lusiani, Only the Little People Pay Taxes: Tax Evasion and Switzerland’s Extraterritorial 
Obligations to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in LITIGATING TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS: ALTERNATIVE JUDGMENTS 121 (Mark Gibney & Wouter Vandenhole, eds., 2014). 
58
 GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: TRADE MISINVOICING AND THE IMPACT OF REVENUE 
LOSS IN GHANA, KENYA, MOZAMBIQUE, TANZANIA, AND UGANDA: 2002-11 vii (2014). 
59
 GUTTORM SCHJELDERUP ET AL., NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TAX HAVENS AND DEVELOPMENT 
52 (2009). 
60
 Carmona, supra note 10, at ¶ 77. 
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debt burden, a number of researchers…have shown that sustained illicit outflows have turned the 
continent into a net creditor to the rest of the world.”61 Lusiani highlights the estimate that the 
money lost in low and middle-income countries to IFFs in 2009 (more than sixty percent of 
which was attributable to tax evasion) was more than ten times the value of the ODA sent to 
those countries in that year.62  
These revenue losses have broad effects on national budgets, economies, and societies. 
Governments tend to try to make up for these lost revenues by increasing regressive taxes or 
reducing spending on social welfare.63 O’Hare et al., studying IFFs generally, found that 
curtailing such flows would have led to timely accomplishment of the fourth Millennium 
Development Goal, a two-thirds reduction in the under-five mortality rate within sixteen Sub-
Saharan African countries, and significant reductions in accomplishment time in eighteen 
others.64 But social spending is not the only area of government expenditure affected. As 
ActionAid asserts:  
“[M]aking investment profitable in developing countries depends on 
functioning infrastructure such as roads and airports, and on a healthy and 
educated workforce. When global businesses and investors use tax haven 
structures and offshore profits to avoid paying taxes in poor countries, they are 
both undermining their own long-term financial prospects, and free-riding on 
other individuals and businesses in developing countries that do not have 
access to tax havens, and which shoulder an excessive share of the tax 
burden.”65  
Indeed, these effects go beyond government spending to distort economic power and income 
distribution across the entire economy. Tax abuse by large international companies can 
undermine efforts to give tax support to small and medium local businesses, giving rise to “the 
missing middle,” an economy built primarily on large enterprises and extremely small, informal 
ones.66 These practices create an edge for multinationals over local businesses,67 and local 
partners of multinational corporations may also suffer from lost dividend payments and reduced 
profitability.68 Tax-driven corporate behavior can also result in the “de-skilling of a sector or an 
economy if high-value functions are offshored to low-tax jurisdictions,” 69 reduced local wages 
or returns to local shareholders,70 and increased employment volatility.71 
                                                 
61
 GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, supra note 59, at 6. 
62
 Lusiani, supra note 58, at 117.  
63
 Id. at 119. 
64
 Bernadette O’Hare et al., The Effect of Illicit Financial Flows on Time to Reach the Fourth Millennium 
Development Goal in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Quantitative Analysis, 107 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 148-56 (2014). 
“
65
 ACTIONAID, supra note 9, at 6. 
66
 CHRISTIAN AID, THE MISSING MILLIONS: THE COST OF TAX DODGING TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SUPPORTED BY 
THE SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT 3 (2009). 
67
 ACTIONAID, supra note 9, at 6. 
68
 Id. at 28. 
69
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Further, transfer mispricing disproportionately impacts countries with significant 
inequality.72 Abusive tax practices “make efforts to tax wealth largely ineffective and therefore 
contribute directly to worsening income inequality.”73 GFI points out, “So long as illicit capital 
continues to hemorrhage out of poor African countries over the long term at a rapid pace, efforts 
to reduce poverty and boost economic growth will be thwarted as income distribution becomes 
ever more skewed leading to economic and political instability.”74 As discussed above, the bulk 
of the illicit capital outflows studied by GFI are attributable to transfer mispricing. 
As that quote suggests, beyond the economy, transfer mispricing can be detrimental to 
security and trust. Cobham describes, “a growing base of evidence on the linkages; in particular, 
[between transfer mispricing and similar IFFs and] ‘positive security’ (the ability of states to 
provide secure conditions in which rapid human development can take place).”75 He points out 
that “a vicious cycle is possible: [IFFs] undermine the resources available to states, and their 
effectiveness (and often willingness) to use resources for broad-based development, undermining 
human development outcomes; while weak institutions and a lack of confidence in fair political 
representation encourage further [IFFs].”76 What is more, “the legal use by a multinational of 
highly secretive jurisdictions may both provide cover for illegal use of the same secrecy, and also 
inadvertently legitimize such behaviour.”77 In addition to its primary purpose of reducing taxes 
paid by corporations, transfer mispricing can be used “as a technique for money laundering … 
capital flight, and import duty fraud.”78 Thus this is another vicious cycle: “economic growth 
without credible [tax] reform could lead to more, not less, capital flight, as the increase in 
incomes would simply finance the increased accumulation of foreign assets.”79 
 
II. TRANSFER MISPRICING AS A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
From the above it is evident that transfer mispricing has significant negative effects on 
economic growth, social services, and security as well as revenue collection. But how is this a 
human rights issue rather than simply a question of economics and policy? In fact, transfer 
mispricing leads to violations of a number of international human rights laws and instruments, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and the Declaration on the Right to Development. This section 
illustrates how transfer mispricing violates human rights law, as laid out in the texts of 
international human rights treaties, declarations, and other instruments of soft and hard law. 
Mispricing reduces the resources available for human rights, impedes the rights to development 
and self-determination, and damages efforts to ensure equality, non-discrimination, 
accountability, and transparency. States, by allowing transfer mispricing, are failing to live up to 
                                                 
72
 Lusiani, supra note 58, at 119. 
73
 TAX JUSTICE NETWORK-AFRICA & CHRISTIAN AID, supra note 10, at 28. 
74
 GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, supra note 59, at 17. 
75
 ALEX COBHAM, THE IMPACTS OF ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: STUDY FOR 
TANA HIGH-LEVEL FORUM ON SECURITY IN AFRICA 2014 ii (2014), 
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/34769/3/IFFs%20and%20Security%20(1).pdf?1. 
76
 COBHAM, supra note 76. 
77
 Id. at 3. 
78
 David Spencer, Cross-Border Tax Evasion and Bretton Woods II, Part 3, 20 J. INT’L TAX’N 44, 50 (2009). 
79
 GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, supra note 59, at 17. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [2017 
 10 
their human rights responsibilities as actors in a global community. Section III will turn to the 
utility of approaching transfer mispricing from a human rights perspective. 
 
A. Transfer mispricing keeps states from devoting maximum  
available resources to human rights. 
 
Perhaps the most immediately obvious impact of transfer mispricing on human rights is that 
the practice deprives the government of revenues that could be spent instead on respecting, 
promoting, protecting, and fulfilling human rights obligations. This is especially relevant in the 
context of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR,80 under which “Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by 
all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”81 This 
requirement is also echoed in Article 4 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”).82  
The questions of what it means to devote “maximum available resources” to the realization 
of human rights, or of what it means to “progressively achieve” that realization are sources of 
much debate within and outside the human rights community.83 However, one certainty is that, 
despite the claims of some critics, the flexibility of progressive realization does not deprive 
economic, social, and cultural rights of any real meaning or obligation.84 To the contrary, the 
committee charged with interpreting the ICESCR and monitoring its implementation has held 
that states do have an immediate obligation under the Covenant to provide minimum essential 
levels of the rights therein.85 It is also worth noting that while these questions are primarily 
discussed in relation to economic, social, and cultural rights, owing in large part to the 
differences in language between Article 2 of the ICESCR and the corresponding article in the 
ICCPR, the question of allocation of state resources is essential to the realization of all human 
rights, as realization of civil and political rights is only possible through the funding of 
government institutions including an adequate independent judiciary, a well-trained and well-
regulated police force, and free and fair elections.86 To this point, and relevant specifically not 
only to resources generally, but to taxation in particular, a former U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
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extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions chronicled how inadequate revenue collection 
and allocation contributed to a broken criminal justice system and a culture of impunity in 
Guatemala, saying: “The lack of resources is due to a lack of political will: rather than funding a 
high-quality criminal justice system, Congress has decided to impose very low levels of taxation 
and, thus, to starve the criminal justice system and other parts of Government.”87 
While the concept of maximum available resources has not yet been completely defined by 
the law and commentary, a body of interpretation by courts and commentators suggests that it 
requires efficient and equitable action by the state.88 Good fiscal policy, including effective 
taxation, is essential to efficient and equitable government action, and “is one of the key policy 
instruments states have to shape the conditions in which all human rights…can be fulfilled.”89 As 
elaborated in the U.N.’s Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty: “States should make certain 
that adequate resources are raised and used to ensure the realization of the human rights of 
persons living in poverty. Fiscal policies, including in relation to revenue collection, budget 
allocations and expenditure, must comply with human rights standards and principles, in 
particular equality and non-discrimination.”90 The U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child 
has also notably recognized that a failure to combat tax evasion and to ensure a functioning 
system of tax collection can interfere with a state’s ability to allocate sufficient resources to 
human rights protection and implementation.91  
Of course, it must be acknowledged that the collection of taxes is only one part of what must 
be done to fulfill states’ obligations under Article 2 of the ICESCR and other human rights 
instruments. As the IBAHRI emphasizes, “a full discussion of the human rights implications of 
tax abuses requires not only an examination of the state’s obligations as a tax collector, but also 
an examination of its obligations in terms of allocating and spending increased tax revenues.”92 
In other words, revenue must not only be made available, it must be used for the realization of 
human rights. This has led a number of human rights actors to study resource allocation issues, 
including examining topics like human rights budgeting,93 and questions of allocation have been 
the focus of litigation over maximum available resources, notably in South Africa, where the 
concept of available resources for rights is enshrined in the constitution.94 Still, the collection of 
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adequate resources is an important precondition for the proper allocation of those resources, and 
tax and fiscal policy are an important component of resource mobilization.95 
These questions are particularly relevant in an era when countries around the world, at all 
stages of development, are experiencing fiscal contractions and moving towards instituting 
austerity measures with significant impact on the realization of all human rights, and particularly 
economic and social rights, both because of domestic policy choices and because of international 
pressure to adopt such measures. As a network of European NGOs pointed out in 2013, 
“currently, 98 countries have introduced or are considering wage bill caps or cuts, including in 
the education and public health sectors; 86 are working on pension ‘reforms’; 80 countries are 
reconsidering their safety nets; and 100 countries are revising and reducing subsidies, including 
on food products. Meanwhile large amounts of wealth are still escaping the tax net through tax 
evasion and tax avoidance.”96 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which 
interprets and monitors the ICESCR, has recognized the threat that austerity measures can pose 
to the realization of human rights, especially for the most vulnerable, and has written an open 
letter to member states on the subject, calling on them to ensure that policies “comprise all 
possible measures, including tax measures, to support social transfers to mitigate inequalities that 
can grow in times of crisis and to ensure that the rights of the disadvantaged and marginalized 
individuals and groups are not disproportionately affected.”97 
Issues surrounding adequate revenue collection and allocation matter in particular to 
developing countries, where, as discussed above, tax enforcement may be weaker and the tax 
base may be significantly smaller, limiting the availability of government resources and the 
possibilities for maximizing them.98 On average, low-income country tax revenues represent 
only about thirteen percent of GDP, compared to an average of thirty-six percent in the OECD 
countries.99 As a European NGO coalition has recognized, “in developing countries the impacts 
of the missing tax revenues are felt directly by the world’s poorest people, who depend on their 
public sector to provide education, healthcare and basic social services.”100 A number of actors 
have calculated exactly what these missing revenues mean for the fulfillment of economic, 
social, and cultural rights in the developing world and in specific developing countries. For 
example, ActionAid has variously estimated that the money lost by developing countries to tax 
avoidance and evasion constitutes “three times the estimated cost of the agricultural investment 
needed to achieve a world free from hunger, and twelve times the cost of ending the global 
scourge of malnutrition,”101 and that recovery of this money “would raise government spending 
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enough to reduce child deaths in the developing world by 230 children every day.”102 GFI 
estimates that if Ghana had used all of the money lost to trade mispricing for poverty reduction, 
the poverty reduction budget in that country could have been increased by 21.4% in 2011,103 and 
that, “had the government [of Mozambique] been successful in curtailing trade misinvoicing by 
50 percent, it would have been able to expand its social program by nearly 36 percent, which 
represents a significant loss in its fight to alleviate poverty.”104  
 
B. Transfer mispricing impedes the fulfillment of the right to development. 
 
Another right violated by transfer mispricing is the right to development, as elaborated in the 
1986 United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development (“DRD”). The DRD defines the 
right to development as “an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and 
all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and 
political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully 
realized.”105 Thus it enshrines a vision of development that is people-centered and concerned 
with improving lives for individuals, communities, and entire populations, rather than 
exclusively focused on economic growth. It promotes development that is characterized by free, 
active, and meaningful participation of all individuals, communities, and states and the fair 
distribution of the benefits of that development.106 While the DRD is not a binding legal 
instrument, it incorporates many of the rights and principles contained in other human rights 
documents,107 and explicitly emphasizes the indivisibility of all human rights.108 It is a right that 
is recognized in a number of international instruments and in states around the world, and that is 
justiciable in the African human rights system.109 Thus it could potentially form the basis for a 
legal case in the African human rights system, as discussed in Section III(b) below, and is also a 
potential advocacy tool. 
The vision of human-centered economic and social development enshrined in the DRD is 
clearly impeded by transfer mispricing.110 The tax revenues lost through transfer mispricing can 
be spent on social programs, as discussed above, but can also be devoted to development efforts. 
Article 2 of the DRD calls for fair and equitable sharing in development, which can be 
accomplished in part through the redistributive function of taxation.111 Article 8 of the DRD 
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requires states to “undertake…all necessary measures for the realization of the right to 
development,” including adopting appropriate fiscal policy.112 Further, it is important to 
recognize that tax avoidance through transfer mispricing means not just lost tax revenues, but 
also lost profits that might be locally reinvested and thus spur local development and growth,113 
and that tax abuses by TNCs can have detrimental effects on local economies, as described in 
Section I(b) above. 
 
C. Transfer mispricing undermines the right to self-determination. 
 
The right of all peoples to self-determination is a basic and fundamental right in the 
international system, so important as to constitute the common first article of the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR.114 This article in its first paragraph establishes that “All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.”115 As the former Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty and human rights has underlined, this language “has clear implications for 
activities that undermine the ability of other States to raise revenue and fund their own 
development.”116 This notion is closely linked to the principle of sovereignty, which is at the 
heart of international relations and the structure of the United Nations and key to the manner in 
which states interact and cooperate.117  
However, in an increasingly globalized world, notions of sovereignty are challenged at every 
turn, and the global tax system is a potent illustration both of how sovereignty has been eroded 
and how its invocation can be abused. International tax cooperation efforts have been frustrated 
by an emphasis on tax sovereignty, the idea that each state should set its own tax policy without 
any interference from others. However, at the same time, through a combination of structural 
adjustment requirements, power imbalances, the global “race to the bottom” on corporate tax 
rates in order to encourage investment, and the sort of international tax mismatches that enable 
transfer mispricing, this tax sovereignty is in reality non-existent for a number of countries.118 As 
Saiz explains, “national-level policies are shaped and constrained by trends in the international 
tax policy framework.”119 And the revenue lost through weak tax policies and tax enforcement 
can erode sovereignty in other policy areas. “[T]axation . . . allows the government more policy 
space and capacity to be responsive and accountable to national objectives that are not tainted by 
the conditionalities of foreign aid.”120 As the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows in 
Africa noted:  
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“Given the well-known dependence of several African countries on significant 
amounts of official development assistance, the loss of resources through IFFs 
can only serve to deepen reliance on donors. Such dependence is apparent not 
only in terms of funds to support the social sector and state institutions, but also 
in terms of development ideas. It is an established fact that despite assertions of 
ownership, development policy very often reflects the perspectives of creditors 
or donors. Thus, when strapped for resources, African countries can often find 
themselves at the receiving end of externally imposed ideas that might not 
really be in their own perceived interests.”121 
The second paragraph of common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR holds that “All 
peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without 
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit, and international law.”122 Inherent in this language is the idea that 
the natural wealth and resources of a state should be employed to the social benefit of the people 
of that state. This element of the right to self-determination is also threatened by transfer 
mispricing, when TNCs involved in extraction of natural resources use abusive practices to avoid 
paying taxes on the profits of that extraction in the country of origin.123 As referenced above, a 
key example of this possibility is Zambia, which Lusiani notes lost a total amount of capital 
equivalent to half of its GDP, and the accompanying tax revenues, as a result of transfer 
mispricing of copper exports in 2008.124 As the Tax Justice Network-Africa and Christian Aid 
summarize, “[d]espite the huge potential, the income capture by sub-Saharan governments from 
their natural resource sector is extremely low. It is a far from fair share of the wealth extracted 
from the country; a disproportionate share of the benefits goes to the multinational companies 
who extract and sell the resource.”125  
 
D. Transfer mispricing erodes equality and non-discrimination. 
 
Key to fulfilling states’ human rights obligations and included almost universally in human 
rights instruments are the principles of equality and non-discrimination.126 These principles 
require that states act in particular to protect and advance historically marginalized or vulnerable 
groups, including women, children, persons with disabilities, racial and ethnic minorities, and 
those living in extreme poverty. States that do not adequately address issues of tax evasion may 
be unable to fund social programs and thus may entrench persistent social inequalities.127 As a 
global coalition of 157 NGOs declared in 2015, “[t]axation…plays a fundamental role in 
redistributing resources in ways that can prevent and redress gender, economic and other 
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inequalities and reduce the disparities in human rights enjoyment that flow from them.”128 
“[A]ddressing inequality depends on a society’s willingness to reduce social disparities by 
financing equitable policies through taxes and investments. Addressing equity is at the center of 
the social contract between governments and citizens: how much a society is willing to 
redistribute and how to do so.”129 The High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows in Africa 
summarizes the damage that IFFs can do to these rights, stating: 
“The social consequences of IFFs extend … to the worsening inequality in 
Africa. Our earlier observation that IFFs contribute to a regressive tax system 
and impose an unfair tax burden on poorer sections of society is pertinent in 
this regard. IFFs contribute to worsening inequality in Africa in other ways as 
well. The provision of social services and social protection schemes are means 
of reducing inequality. African governments find it increasingly harder to 
provide these forms of support in increasingly constrained economic 
circumstances.”130  
Tax injustice does not only contribute to increasing broad social and economic inequalities 
between rich and poor, but is also particularly likely to impact vulnerable and traditionally 
marginalized groups, who may have a history of exclusion from economic and social opportunity 
and who may rely on non-discriminatory government services in order to remedy past and 
present injustices. Persons with disabilities and women are two groups that are more likely to be 
reliant on government social and health services that suffer when revenues are inadequate,131 and 
two groups that rely on such services to provide a base for a move from historic 
disenfranchisement to lasting economic empowerment.132 
Additionally, it is not just how much tax revenue is collected that matters for questions of 
equality and non-discrimination, but also how those taxes are collected and from whom. “Tax 
reforms promoted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in developing countries 
since the 1980’s have tended to favor the introduction or expansion of indirect taxation (in 
particular through value added taxes or VAT) and reductions in the rates of corporate and 
personal income taxation.”133 This tends to have the effect of shifting the tax burden more 
towards the poor and marginalized.134 Specifically in the gender context, Elson’s analysis shows 
that “if tax paid by corporations falls and by persons rises…the incidence of tax on women, 
especially poor women, will tend to increase.”135 When states fail to address transfer mispricing, 
they fail to live up to their human rights obligations to the principles of equality and non-
discrimination, both by underfunding social protection programs and by shifting the burden for 
paying for those programs onto those who are most in need. 
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E. Transfer mispricing damages accountability and transparency. 
 
International human rights law includes a set of human rights principles that must guide 
government policy-making in all arenas and that are integral to good governance. As the former 
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights has emphasized, “[t]he rights to 
participation, accountability, transparency, and access to information are critical human rights 
principles that also apply to fiscal policies.”136 This requirement, rooted in states’ international 
human rights commitments, means, among other things, that tax policies should be open to 
judicial oversight137 and that public officials should be accountable for fiscal decisions that 
imperil human rights.138 Unfortunately, many of the policies that enable transfer mispricing not 
only fail to respect these basic requirements, but also act to undermine essential human rights 
principles in a number of ways.  
As Cobham explains:  
“Effective taxation provides 4 R’s: not only revenue, and the opportunity to 
reprice social goods and bads, but redistribution and political representation. 
Taxation should provide both the funds and the means to redistribute in order 
to address important deficits in positive security. In addition, however, taxation 
provides a critical link to effective political representation and wider standards 
of governance.”139  
In other words, a just and fair tax system contributes to broader governance goals through 
common interest processes, by which governments have incentives to promote growth because 
they are dependent on taxes; state capacity processes, in which tax revenue enables the creation 
of effective bureaucracy; and citizen engagement, which encourages greater accountability.140 
Perhaps the human rights and good governance principle most implicated by transfer 
mispricing is transparency, because transfer mispricing is fundamentally a problem of 
transparency,141 and a violation of the right to information, as embodied in Article 19 of the 
ICCPR.142 Transfer mispricing is enabled by secrecy about corporate profits, assets, and 
ownership, and by lack of effective information sharing between the different jurisdictions in 
which corporations operate. As a result, these corporations have an incentive to use their political 
and economic power to combat efforts to bring greater transparency and participation to the 
global tax system.143 Thus the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows in Africa has asserted: 
“We believe that transparency is key to all efforts to arrest IFFs, given that the primary aim of 
perpetrators is to hide wealth.”144 Accordingly that panel has advocated for better corporate 
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reporting and better exchange of information between countries.145 Such policy changes would 
be consistent with transparency as a human rights principle. 
Additionally, a number of commentators have noted that a just and efficient tax system 
includes an accountability function.146 Taxation is a manifestation of the social contract, and 
therefore encourages government accountability and citizen oversight. Cobham explains: “The 
act of paying tax provides an important accountability link. Empirical studies suggest the higher 
the share of tax in government spending, the stronger the process of improving governance and 
representation; while direct tax – taxes on income, profits and capital gains – appears to play a 
particularly strong role.”147 As a result, abusive tax practices like transfer mispricing damage 
accountability “by generating a revenue escape valve.”148 Tax imbalances often reflect broader 
democratic deficits.149 Further, corporations that seek to engage in abusive tax practices will 
sometimes engage in bribery and other corrupt practices in order to perpetuate these activities, 
thus contributing to “entrenched impunity and the institutionalization of corruption.”150 
 
F. Transfer mispricing violates states’ extraterritorial human rights obligations  
and obligations as members of the international community. 
 
There is an obligation on all states, stemming from their human rights commitments, to 
strengthen their own domestic tax revenue collection and to work together to address the global 
problem of transfer mispricing in service of making sufficient resources available such that all 
human rights can be realized for all. The discussion in this section thus far has implicitly 
emphasized the domestic human rights obligations of states in collecting and distributing taxes. 
However, transfer mispricing is by its very nature an international problem and implicates states’ 
obligations of international cooperation and their responsibilities to one another and to each 
other’s citizens. In other words, transfer mispricing is an example of a human rights violation 
that gives rise to extraterritorial human rights obligations (“ETO”). While each state is primarily 
responsible for human rights issues within its own territory, the interconnectedness of today’s 
globalized world means that these obligations cannot end at national borders. ETOs are grounded 
in the U.N. Charter, the UDHR, the ICESCR, and a number of other human rights treaties and 
instruments.151 They are articulated in the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of 
States in the area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which are non-binding, but gather 
the principles found in  binding instruments, and which describe the obligation of states to 
“desist from acts and omissions that create a real risk of nullifying or impairing the enjoyment of 
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economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially,”152 and to take steps to ensure that TNCs 
that they are in a position to regulate do not violate or impair these rights.153   
A number of actors have enumerated the relevance of ETOs for global taxation issues. As 
Lusiani argues, under the ICESCR, “no State is permitted to infringe on another State’s ability to 
mobilize the resources necessary for fulfilling Covenant rights, including through fiscal and tax 
policy.”154 Thus, the former Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights advises:  
“The actions of States to facilitate and/or actively promote tax abuse and other 
illicit financial flows through their tax secrecy laws and policies could 
jeopardize their compliance with international human rights obligations, 
particularly with regard to international cooperation and economic, social and 
cultural rights. States should therefore take concerted and coordinated 
measures against tax evasion globally as part of their domestic and 
extraterritorial human rights obligations and their duty to protect people from 
human rights violations by third parties, including business enterprises . . . .”155  
Article 28 of the UDHR holds that “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in 
which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”156  Article 3(3) 
of the DRD operationalizes this requirement, by calling on states “to promote a new international 
economic order based on sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and cooperation 
among all States, as well as to encourage the observation and realization of human rights.”157 
State responsibility to contribute to the formation of this order “can be derived from several 
factors, including a State’s global economic weight and capacity; a State’s relative power and 
influence over the direction of finance, trade and development; and the degree to which a State 
benefits from the existing distribution of global wealth and resources.”158 Human rights laws 
entail an obligation to provide a supranational institutional design that is conducive to the 
fulfilment of human rights and the reduction of poverty.159 The U.N.’s Guiding Principles on 
Extreme Poverty elaborate on this obligation, insisting that “States must take deliberate, specific 
and targeted steps, individually and jointly, to create an international enabling environment 
conducive to poverty reduction, including in matters relating to bilateral and multilateral trade, 
investment, taxation, finance, environmental protection and development cooperation.”160  
Permitting transfer mispricing is an example of a violation of the obligation to create an 
international global order that is conducive to fulfillment of human rights and the reduction of 
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poverty,161 and a symptom of an international system that is currently inequitable and unjust. It is 
state action that makes it so. Bilateral tax treaties currently tend to aggravate transfer mispricing 
issues by allocating tax rights in a manner that is detrimental to developing countries and by 
lowering taxation of cross-border financial transfers.162 Tax laws can give rise to “inequality 
spirals,” where those in positions of strength are able to reinforce that strength through greater 
access.163 Even in their efforts to actually address this problem, thus far, developed country 
governments have supported the OECD taking the lead on transfer mispricing issues, despite the 
limited role that this implies for developing country governments,164 and the OECD’s own 
admission that developing country priorities may not be emphasized in its approach.165 The 
responsibility to create a just social and economic order impels states to generate a human rights-
conscious framework for all aspects of foreign direct investment (“FDI”),166 including the way in 
which corporations making those investments are taxed. Thus far, contrary to the urging of the 
UDHR, they have failed to do so.167 
Inextricably linked to the creation of a just social and international order and equally relevant 
to the issue of transfer mispricing is the requirement of international cooperation for the 
realization of human rights. This principle is laid out in the very first article of the UDHR, which 
holds that “[a]ll human beings…should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood,”168 
and given legal force in Article 2 of the ICESCR, which includes a requirement that states act 
through international assistance and cooperation to progressively realize human rights.169 It is 
more fully fleshed out in articles 3 and 4 of the DRD, which require that states demonstrate full 
respect for the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation 
among states, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,170 and that they cooperate 
with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development, in 
formulating international development policies, in creating national and international conditions 
favorable to the realization of the right to development, in encouraging the observance and 
realization of human rights, and in promoting a new international economic order based on 
sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and cooperation among all states.171 In 
Article 4, the Declaration also calls for sustained action for more rapid development of 
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developing countries and effective international cooperation to provide them with appropriate 
means and facilities to foster their comprehensive development.172 
The Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty, after calling on states to create an international 
enabling order for human rights, emphasize that “this includes cooperating to mobilize the 
maximum of available resources for the universal fulfillment of human rights.”173 Similarly, the 
Committee on Economic and Social Rights ended an open letter to States Parties with the 
reminder “that international cooperation is a fundamental obligation for the progressive universal 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights.”174 More broadly, a U.N. Secretary-General’s 
Report explains: 
“In a world of interconnected threats and challenges, it is in each country’s 
self-interest that all of them are addressed effectively. Hence, the cause of 
larger freedom can only be advanced by broad, deep and sustained global 
cooperation among States. Such cooperation is possible if every country’s 
policies take into account not only the needs of its own citizens but also the 
needs of others. This kind of cooperation not only advances everyone’s 
interests but also recognizes our common humanity.”175 
       The problem of transfer mispricing is a vivid illustration of the critical need for international 
cooperation to achieve the realization of all human rights, including the right to development. 
Tax abuse of this sort is an inherently international problem that “is not possible in a domestic 
vacuum.”176 The Africa Progress Panel has explained: “Tax evasion is a global problem that 
requires multilateral solutions. Africa cannot combat tax evasion solely through national and 
regional policy.”177 They point to tax havens, secrecy jurisdictions, and the complexities of TNC 
structures as cross-border problems.178 Thus they insist: “Far more than increased aid, what 
Africa needs is strengthened international cooperation so that it can secure a fair share of the 
wealth now being drained out of the region through unfair and sometimes illegal practices.”179  
International problems that cannot be solved unilaterally by any one country or region are among 
the stated purposes for the existence of the United Nations,180 and Articles 1, 55, and 56 of the 
U.N. Charter require international cooperation to solve them.181 
In sum, transfer mispricing undermines states’ abilities to fulfill their human rights 
obligations in a number of different areas. It is inimical to principles of human rights and good 
governance and represents a failure of international cooperation and global governance. It 
impedes states’ abilities to fully benefit from their own resources and restricts the policy space 
available to create an enabling environment for fair, equitable, and sustainable development. And 
it is both a symptom and a cause of an unjust global economic and social order that leads to 
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systemic violations of the human rights of people living in poverty all over the world.182 The 
good news is that understanding transfer mispricing as a human rights violation may open up 
new avenues to combat these practices, and this is what we turn to in the next section. 
 
III. COMBATING TRANSFER MISPRICING USING HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Transfer mispricing is widely recognized as a global problem, damaging to governments, 
economies, and human rights around the world.183 Naturally a number of academics, activists, 
and policy-makers have proposed potential solutions to this problem, notably led by the Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) Project at the OECD.184 However, there is no broad 
consensus on the best actions for the global community to take to combat these and other tax 
abuses. The solutions proposed by the OECD are criticized as too weak,185 but more incisive 
actions have failed to gather widespread support.186 This section of the paper describes some of 
the proposed technical and legal strategies for addressing transfer mispricing and then proposes 
that analyzing transfer mispricing from a human rights perspective may offer a way forward in 
the debate around how to address the problem, less by proposing new solutions than by opening 
up new fora in which those solutions can be discussed and new perspectives for viewing them, as 
well as increasing public pressure on policy-makers. 
 
A. Proposed strategies for combating transfer mispricing. 
 
The main strategy that countries around the world use to avoid the problem of transfer 
mispricing is the requirement and enforcement of the “arm’s length method,” as advocated by 
the OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines.187 The essential thrust of the arm’s length principle is 
that for tax purposes companies should treat related enterprises as separate businesses and should 
set prices at market rates, in the same manner that they would with an unrelated entity.188 Thus, 
for example, when Glencore’s mine in Zambia sells copper to its affiliate in Switzerland, for tax 
purposes the Zambian government would consider the copper to have been sold at the market 
price that Glencore would have received from selling the copper to an unrelated buyer, and tax 
the Zambian subsidiary accordingly.  
However, this method can be difficult to use for sophisticated transactions, for certain goods 
and services it is not possible to establish a market price, and it can be hard to account for 
intangible goods, like intellectual property, using this method.189 To return again to prior 
examples, it is very difficult to calculate what SABMiller’s breweries in Ghana might have paid 
to an outside company for the right to use the Castle beer brand, or for an amorphous set of 
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management services. In order to account for these failings, Brazil has instituted a set of reforms 
whereby, “when dealing with intra-firm trade in areas lacking comparable prices, tax authorities 
will determine a price through a credible institution, or relevant price on a commodities 
exchange, and apply it to the transactions in question. All companies trading from Brazil through 
low tax jurisdictions will be subject to the new regime.”190  
While some reformers suggest following the Brazilian model, others seek to replace the 
arm’s length method entirely, advocating instead a system known as worldwide unitary taxation, 
by which taxes are apportioned among jurisdictions where a multinational corporation operates 
according to the activity that the corporation conducts within each jurisdiction.191 Thus in the 
case of SABMiller’s Ghana breweries, it might be determined, for example, that seventy percent 
of the activity to produce the products comes from the actual brewing in Ghana, twenty percent 
comes from the holding and developing of the brand in the Netherlands, and ten percent from the 
management services provided in Switzerland. Accordingly, Ghana would be able to levy tax on 
seventy percent of the group’s profits, the Netherlands on twenty percent, and Switzerland on ten 
percent, each according to the tax rates established by domestic law. In this way the 
corporation’s income is taxed without reference to its internal organization, eliminating 
incentives to shift profit within the corporation.192 However, this system could be complex to 
implement, and might still involve iniquities.193  Notably, this is not a system that can be 
enforced unilaterally; as suggested by the name, there must be a worldwide commitment to the 
imposition of unitary taxation,194 and right now there is very little enthusiasm for the idea among 
the governments of OECD countries.195 This is because the current global system of allocation of 
taxing rights favors the “home” countries where TNCs are based over the “source” countries 
where they invest, and thus developed nations stand to lose from a more equitable system.196 
Further, this system places higher disclosure requirements on corporations, as it can best be 
supported by country-by-country reporting of financial and tax information.197 
Even without imposing an entirely new global transfer pricing system, there are a number of 
reforms that have been proposed that could serve to make the current system more fair and 
effective. Saiz notes that “growing advocacy by groups such as the Tax Justice Network has 
prompted stronger international commitments to clamp down on tax havens and secrecy 
jurisdictions, to foster progressive and transparent tax systems, and to ensure greater 
international cooperation on tax, regulation and crime.”198 One potential method of securing this 
greater international cooperation would be the establishment of a U.N. intergovernmental body 
on tax issues,199 which was the subject of strong but ultimately unsuccessful lobbying by 
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developing countries at the Addis Ababa Financing for Development Conference in July 2015.200 
Saiz also suggests the possible imposition of international minimum corporate tax rates.201 While 
this proposal is primarily aimed at preventing a “race to the bottom” as countries compete to 
attract foreign investment, it would also serve to minimize some of the incentives to shift profits 
from one jurisdiction to another. 
As referenced above, the OECD, through its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) 
project, is working to address the harm caused by transfer mispricing. Key elements of this effort 
include a move to requiring country-by-country reporting by multinationals,202 as well as 
eliminating the possibility of holding intellectual property in low-tax jurisdictions where 
companies have no other real presence, and facilitating information exchanges between 
nations.203 However, the BEPS project has been criticized for the lack of meaningful 
participation of developing countries, undue private sector influence, assumptions that privilege 
developed country interests and the potential for continued gaps and loopholes.204 Indeed, even 
the Director of the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and Administration acknowledges that the 
priorities of developing countries are not a primary concern for the BEPS project.205 There is 
ultimately a sense among those who advocate for tax justice that despite significant rhetoric 
around the issue of transfer mispricing, governments, especially in developed countries, have not 
really acted to take the steps that might remedy the problem.206 This is both a reason why transfer 
mispricing constitutes a human rights violation and why it might be useful to use a human rights 
frame to address this problem. 
 
B. Human rights enforcement mechanisms can increase pressure on  
states to address transfer mispricing. 
 
The international human rights system encompasses a number of mechanisms for addressing 
violations of human rights, with varying degrees of enforcement capabilities. On the soft power 
end of the spectrum are the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, which are 
empowered to make country visits and to present country and thematic reports to the Council.207 
As has been referenced several times throughout this paper, both the current and former Special 
Rapporteurs on extreme poverty and human rights have shown particular interest in issues of tax 
policy, including transfer mispricing.208 The Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health has also recognized 
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tax evasion and reduced tax revenues as having a direct impact on the allocation of sufficient 
resources for health.209 Additionally, the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and 
other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human 
rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, recently completed a report on illicit 
financial flows, human rights, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that covers 
transfer mispricing and its relation to human rights.210 
Another mechanism that has gained increasing attention in recent years is the Universal 
Periodic Review (“UPR”), a process by which states report regularly to the Human Rights 
Council regarding their efforts to fulfil their human rights obligations.211 Civil society is able to 
contribute through stakeholder submissions and by lobbying states.212 States are given the 
opportunity to question other states about their human rights situation, and the Council issues a 
set of recommendations.213 As the IBAHRI report suggests, there is “no reason that” tax issues 
should not be raised through the UPR.214 In fact, a Swiss NGO coalition included Switzerland’s 
failure to adequately regulate multinational corporations in its submission to the Council during 
Switzerland’s most recent UPR process,215 and similar considerations could be raised during the 
UPR process for other states whose tax policy is viewed as facilitating transfer mispricing. Other 
U.N. human rights treaty bodies, which are charged with monitoring the implementation of the 
various human rights treaties, have similar review processes in which such issues can be 
raised.216 For example, in 2016 a coalition of NGOs submitted a report prior to Switzerland’s 
review before the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women highlighting 
the effects that Switzerland’s role in cross border tax abuse have for women’s rights and gender 
equality.217 
Additionally, there is the possibility of raising a formal complaint before one of the treaty 
bodies, which generally have some capacity to hear both individual and inter-state complaints. 
Lusiani suggests the possibility of an inter-state complaint against a tax haven before the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, offering the example of a complaint 
brought by Zambia against Switzerland.218 His imagined action relies on the obligations of 
parties to the ICESCR to refrain from actions or omissions that impair the enjoyment of human 
rights, to protect against human rights abuse by third parties, and to cooperate and assist in 
mobilizing maximum available resources.219 However, while Lusiani presents an interesting, and 
certainly theoretically valid proposal, the reality is that there is very little political will to bring 
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inter-state complaints within the U.N. human rights system.220 Individual complaints are more 
feasible, but are generally only allowed against states that have ratified certain optional protocols 
to the various treaties, and are limited to violations that occur within national boundaries,221 
limiting the possibility of addressing the transnational scourge of transfer mispricing. 
Finally, there is the possibility of using regional human rights courts. This may be 
particularly relevant in the African system where a great deal of evidence has been accumulated 
about the impact of transfer mispricing, and where, as referenced above, the right to development 
is fully justiciable.222 However, this option would only allow for complaints against African 
states, again, failing to address the transnational character of transfer mispricing. Still, it is 
possible to imagine a state under the influence of corporate power failing to act to the best of its 
independent abilities to limit transfer mispricing, and this situation could provide a basis for 
public interest litigation in the regional courts.  
 
C. Businesses should incorporate transfer mispricing and other  
tax issues in their human rights policies. 
 
With the rise of globalization and the power of TNCs and the erosion of state sovereignty, 
issues of the impacts of businesses on human rights and their accountability for human rights 
violations have become hot topics in the global human rights arena.223 This debate is relevant to 
questions of transfer mispricing, which, while enabled by state action and policy, is ultimately a 
corporate act. The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, developed by John 
Ruggie, then the Special Representative to the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, and adopted by the Human Rights 
Council in 2011, lay out a “Respect, Protect, and Remedy” framework that calls on businesses to 
respect human rights in their dealings and on states to take action to protect against violations of 
human rights by businesses both within and outside of their borders.224 
The former Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights has very clearly 
explained how this framework applies in the context of taxation of TNCs. With regard to state 
obligations, she says:  
“that States should take steps to prevent violations of human rights outside of 
their territories as a result of the activities of business enterprises that are 
incorporated under their laws or that have their main seat or place of business 
under their jurisdiction. For example, States should take measures to ensure 
that business enterprises that the State is in a position to regulate, including 
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legal, accounting and other specialized firms that assist in tax abuse, do not 
participate in or facilitate tax abuse or illicit financial flows, given that they 
have a detrimental impact on the realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights.”225  
And regarding business obligations, she adds,  
“[M]oreover, under the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
business enterprises also have a responsibility to respect human rights . . . . 
Business practices that avoid taxation may breach their responsibility to respect 
insofar as such actions have a negative human rights impact . . . . In addition, 
business enterprises that knowingly avoid paying tax are purposefully 
depriving countries of the resources they need to fulfil their human rights 
obligations.”226  
To this end, the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt has suggested that “one 
obvious way for business enterprises to show responsible behaviour and demonstrate compliance 
is to embrace a greater degree of transparency, in particular by publishing on a country-by-
country basis their sales, profits and taxes.”227 Further, the OECD guidelines for multinational 
enterprises incorporate the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and also 
include specific guidance on taxation, suggesting that companies should “comply with both the 
letter and the spirit” of tax laws and regulations.228  
However, despite the clarity of this position and despite the fact that there is a need for 
corporations “to realise that it is in their longer-term commercial interest to contribute to 
financing the infrastructure, communications, and education levels upon which strong markets 
depend,”229 there is a tendency of businesses to omit tax issues from their human rights, 
sustainable development, or Corporate Social Responsibility policies,230 and the discourse 
around state protection from human rights violations by businesses also has not tended to focus 
on this issue.231 This may stem from what De Schutter has identified as the propensity for the 
business and human rights discourse to concentrate on what he calls “micro-analysis” – that is, 
an examination of the human rights “impact of a particular investment or project.”232  
Considering transfer mispricing in the context of business and human rights, conversely, is 
consistent with the “macro-analysis” of business and human rights that he recommends, which 
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looks beyond particular instances of human rights violations by corporations to the structural 
effects that business activity can have on the overall realization of rights.233 De Schutter 
elaborates: “The legal framework of FDI, in particular, must be critically examined from that 
perspective. Otherwise there exists a real risk that, while we devote our energies to scrutinizing 
the activities of TNCs in developing states, we forget about the structural dimensions of their 
presence in those states, such as the pressure under which developing states are to attract FDI 
and the concessions they make to ensure that foreign capital flows in, or the consequences of 
FDI on the situation of local producers and investors or on the relative wages.”234 In applying 
this analysis specifically to the use of export processing zones to attract FDI, De Schutter 
suggests that, “in particular, the absence or quasi-absence of fiscal revenues for the host country 
from companies investing in [export processing] zones…seem[s] to be in clear tension with the 
right to development of that country.”235 This is equally true for any situation that enables TNCs 
to operate in and extract profit within a country without contributing to that country’s fiscal 
revenues.236 
De Schutter’s macro-analysis represents a vision of the business and human rights framework 
that is consistent with the principle of international cooperation and the requirement of an 
international social and economic order that provides an enabling environment for the realization 
of human rights. If states and businesses are truly committed to the realization of human rights 
and to a vision of sustainable development that provides long-term prosperity and improvement 
of the human condition, they will have to start giving more attention to structural aspects of the 
business and human rights issue, including trade, investment, and international tax policy and the 
problem of transfer mispricing. 
 
D. A human rights analytical framework can shift the discourse on transfer  
mispricing and increase public awareness. 
 
Ultimately, however, perhaps the greatest contribution that examining transfer mispricing as 
a human rights issue can make is as a discursive and analytical tool, bringing a new perspective 
to a conversation that is often dominated by technicality and politics and confined to the realms 
of economists and diplomats. A human rights perspective has the potential to shift the dominant 
tax policy discourse.237 Emphasizing the duty of states to devote maximum available resources to 
the realization of human rights moves away from questions of how much revenue is collected 
and in what manner. towards questions of allocation and the real uses that revenue can be put 
to.238 At the same time, incorporating human rights’ emphasis on equality and non-
discrimination brings in questions of who really benefits from tax policy and revenue allocation, 
and recognizing the need for international cooperation in the realization of human rights contests 
the dominance of the principle of tax sovereignty.239 “Using the language of rights could thus 
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help articulate an approach to tax policy that is more responsive to the problems of global 
poverty and economic inequality.”240  
A human rights perspective casts the tax policy discourse in terms of duty-bearers and rights-
holders, recognizing that, while corporations have an obligation not to engage in transfer 
mispricing, ultimate responsibility for ending these practices lies with the state.241 As Kinley 
emphasizes, “The significance…of the role of governments in the global economy is not just to 
facilitate the conditions for productive, prosperous and prudent commercial enterprise, but also 
to ensure that, in the process, they do not renege on their social responsibilities to promote 
freedom, equality, order and welfare as represented, in part, by their international human rights 
law obligations.”242  
Using human rights language puts a human face on debates over tax policy.243 As Robinson 
has noted, “Rights lend moral legitimacy and reinforce principles of social justice that already 
underpin much development thinking. They help shift the focus of analysis to the most deprived 
and excluded, especially to deprivations caused by discrimination.”244 The need for this framing 
is evident even within governments. As one tax official interviewed by IBAHRI proposed, 
“Legally, it may not make much of a difference to understand tax evasion as a human rights 
issue. However the human rights analysis could be very important to help strengthen the tax 
system from a tax morale and political perspective.”245 
Overall, applying a human rights perspective may seem only relevant to realms of discussion 
and debate, but in reality it can have a genuine policy impact. It is important to note that human 
rights treaties are binding legal obligations on states, and thus, as the Guidelines on Extreme 
Poverty remind us, “States should take into account their international human rights obligations 
when designing and implementing all policies, including international trade, taxation, fiscal, 
monetary, environmental and investment policies…Before adopting any international agreement, 
or implementing any policy measure, States should assess whether it is compatible with their 
international human rights obligations.”246 Human rights impact assessments are a policy tool 
that can be applied to tax regimes, in order to provide “rigorous, evidence-based scrutiny of the 
impacts tax laws, policies and practices have on human rights and equality abroad”247 and at 
home. 
Further, discussing transfer mispricing as a human rights issue can increase pressure around 
these issues from the grassroots, civil society, and the international community.248 “[H]uman 
rights can provide a useful frame of reference for greater engagement by citizens in the complex 
and technical issues related to tax,”249 and human rights activism is adept at using time-honoured 
“naming and shaming” techniques to bring political pressure on states and on private actors. 
These techniques have been empirically shown to have an effect in this area, by Dyreng, Hoopes, 
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and Wilde, who demonstrate how an ActionAid campaign pressured FTSE 100 companies to 
comply with tax disclosure rules.250 
Ultimately, the fight to combat transfer mispricing is a long and difficult one, requiring a 
struggle against powerful interests, a great deal of technical expertise, and a commitment to 
international cooperation. The mechanisms, guidance, and perspective of the international human 
rights system do not provide an instant solution to this problem. But they do offer new avenues 





It has now been acknowledged that there are a number of systemic causes of detriment to the 
enjoyment of human rights that do not fit a traditional understanding of human rights violations 
as the specific acts of an individual agent or small group of agents against a particular victim or 
group of victims.251 Recognizing that there are more systemic sources of harm, linked to the 
operation of social institutions like the global tax regime, some have suggested that a human 
rights violation can be said to occur “when there is an avoidable contribution to a negative 
human rights impact, and one where those contributing are in a position to know how their 
conduct results in a negative impact.”252 Under this definition, engaging in or allowing transfer 
mispricing constitutes a human rights violation. The question then is what is to be done about 
this violation, what tools are at our disposal for combating it? The good news where transfer 
mispricing is concerned is that this is not necessarily an issue where a traditional imbalance of 
power will necessarily hamper efforts to address the problem: while developed countries may 
have some interest in protecting the profits of the TNCs that call them home, they also have a 
significant interest in putting an end to the revenue losses that they themselves experience as a 
result of these abusive practices.253 The challenge is bringing these interests in line with those of 
developing countries, and most importantly, with those of rights-holding individuals and 
communities around the world who bear the true burden of these abuses, and finding a solution 
that is just, equitable, and capable of being implemented around the world. 
International human rights law provides tools to use in the search for that solution, and an 
analytical frame for that search. Most importantly, it provides a legal obligation for states to 
solve this problem. As described in Section II above, allowing transfer mispricing violates a 
number of human rights treaties and instruments, including the UDHR, the ICESCR, the ICCPR, 
the CRC and the DRD. By acting to address transfer mispricing, states will be better able to 
comply with their obligations under the ICESCR to take steps towards the progressive realization 
of economic, social, and cultural rights. They will help to create stronger societies with greater 
incorporation of human rights principles, including equality and non-discrimination and good 
governance principles: participation, accountability and transparency. Finally, they will be closer 
to fulfilling the promise of the right to development, the promise of a world where international 
cooperation can give rise to a new, just international social and economic order where genuinely 
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sustainable, human-centered social, economic, cultural and political development can take place 
in an enabling environment for all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
